ASCI 638 Case Analysis Effectiveness

In UAS human factors applications, a case analysis is an effective tool for making decisions that guide policies and procedures. A case analysis looks at a problem, examines alternative solutions, and proposes the most effective solution based on the collected evidence (Ashford, 2013). For this course specifically, applying a case analysis to a human factors problem required collecting evidence and solutions from other similar types of UAS operations or manned operations and applying lessons learned. This proved to be a challenge, as UAS human factors, especially in commercial small UAS applications, is a relatively new area of study. No studies (to date) have been conducted on the human factors implications of the DJI “GO” mobile application for remotely piloting their products, but studies have been conducted on the relationship of the size of displays and a pilot’s ability to fly precisely, so an implication can be inferred.

In my prior career in UAS defense contracting, informal case analysis was an internal business tool used to approach solutions for government needs. For example, the first step for a government agency to express interest in a technological solution is to publish a request for information (RFI) that can to a request for proposal (RFP), and a company can have the ability to influence the RFP by presenting a case analysis based on prior research (Bame, 2016). However, in the UAS defense industry, RFPs, proposals, and contract awards moved at a breakneck speed (compared to the rest of government), so I did not observe a regular practice of conducting formal case analysis studies to decide an approach to a business solution – it was more common to aggressively pursue flexibility in meeting all parameters of a RFP.

I think case analysis studies will be an important piece of my current line of work in UAS higher education, especially in the human factors areas of study that involve training. Manned aviation training has been addressed in multiple human factors studies, particularly for general aviation and modern technologically advanced aircraft (TAA). UAS training is only just getting started as a formal segment of a quickly-growing industry. There are no industry standards for UAS training, and the U.S. government does not currently maintain UAS training standards to a similar degree as manned aviation training. Therefore, when making decisions on approaches to curriculum development or potential industry partnerships, I will seek to utilize case analysis as a tool much more often than I have in the past.

For this course (ASCI638), the requirements, format, and topical focus seemed appropriate to the course objectives. It was actually quite difficult to select a topic in UAS human factors, as there are so many potential areas of study that have not been extensively covered by past research and can benefit from formal case analysis. One recommendation would be to provide a greater amount of peer interaction with the case analysis by submitting the case analysis presentation to a discussion board in addition to a course assignment. The only interaction we had with peer case analysis studies was through the initial peer review of abstracts and the proofreading of rough drafts. It would have been nice to see a summary of the completed case analysis in a presentation format that makes it easy to view and submit comments.

Overall, this was a fascinating course and a topic I hope to study further in the future.

References:

Ashford University. (2013). Guidelines for writing a case study analysis. Retrieved from https://awc.ashford.edu/tocw-guidelines-for-writing-a-case-study.html

Bame, M. (2016, August). Overview of the DoD procurement process. Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/overview-dod-procurement-process-1052245

ASCI 638, Module 9: Remote Warfare Human Factors, Ethics, and Morality

I approached this assignment with an open mind, prepared to read available sources and change my opinion for or against the use of UAS in remote warfare. My professional background in the UAS industry began with extensive experience as a contractor providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to the U.S. military. I witnessed firsthand the ability of UAS to provide safety and security, both to soldiers in harm’s way and to the local population, by providing overwatch of essential traffic routes to prevent deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This was one of many different tasks I performed while deployed overseas. It was routine work and extremely boring, but the importance of the task was never downplayed.

Modern warfare and the need to reduce collateral damage to civilians has brought about the need for consistent surveillance of a target prior to a strike (the principle of distinction, discussed below). Armed UAS such as the MQ-9 fulfill both a surveillance and strike role. Warfare requiring additional verification of targets puts manned pilots in harm’s way for a longer period, so UAS provide an advantage. However, the primary human factors challenge with remotely piloting an aircraft is “sensory isolation”; removing the auditory, visual, kinesthetic, and proprioceptive senses from the pilot. Instead of operating an aircraft traditionally, the UAS pilot now commands an aircraft indirectly through programmed routes, menu selections, and dedicated knobs and switches. The role of UAS pilot has shifted from an aircraft operator to a supervisor of automated systems, and the role of human-machine interfaces is more important. Over-trust in an HMI can lead to a lack of vigilance (Hopcroft, Burchat, and Vince, 2006).

Sarah Kreps and John Kaag wrote a legal and ethical analysis of the use of UAVs in contemporary conflict, published in Polity in 2012. They define principles of distinction (the ability to differentiate civilian from combatant) and proportionality (military gain must exceed anticipated damage to civilians), and provide summaries of opposing viewpoints in the discussion on remote warfare. The point that provided most clarity for me was that proportionality can only be defined when the strategic ends are clearly defined. In the case of the “global war on terror,” the strategic ends that justified the means of using remote warfare was the fight against “evil,” a present but abstract enemy. The description of the overall strategy of the U.S. military strategy in 2009 onwards was the use of the term “overseas contingency operations,” where a “contingency” removed the ethical challenge of conducting warfare that “democratically transformed” the Middle East by removal of dictators. Instead, a contingency refers to something that happens by chance, or may happen but has not yet. In this sense, Kreps and Kaag argue that the scope of remote warfare is widened even further by allowing the targeting of anyone, dictator or terrorist, who is actively or could plan to attack the national security of the U.S. The concept of proportionality applied to contingency operations also opens the debate about the role of military operations against enemies who often successfully blend in with a civilian population, delivering a disadvantage to technology. On one hand, a military force carries the responsibility of protecting the civilian population, often to the same degree as protecting themselves, but the argument is that the enemy forces have put themselves in the position to be targeted among civilians and therefore carry the ethical responsibility for civilian casualties.

I agree with the former perspective, especially in an asymmetric environment, where the invading force maintains aerial superiority and can therefore conduct surveillance without opposition. Manned surveillance flights are inherently shorter endurance than unmanned; unmanned aircraft almost exclusively conduct the surveillance of targets. This can lead to an over-reliance on technology to provide distinction. If remote warfare is to be conducted ethically, then policy should exist to communicate standards of proportionality to all levels of warfare decision-making and provide legal ability to individuals at every level to ensure distinction. Practically, this may mean a reduction in strike capability if distinction cannot be assured. The “guy on the ground” will always have the better perspective of the situation; I do not think remote warfare can be morally conducted without this perspective, but I support the use of remote warfare with UAVs to aid this perspective and reduce risk as much as possible.

References:

Hopcroft, R., Burchat, E., and Vince, J. (2006, May). Unmanned aerial vehicles for maritime patrol: human factors issues (DSTO-GD-0463). Fisherman’s Bend, Victoria: Defence Science and Technology Organisation.

Kreps, S., and Kaag, J. (2012, April). The use of unmanned aerial vehicles in contemporary conflict: A legal and ethical analysis. Polity, 44(2), pp. 260-285. Retrieved from http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1057/pol.2012.2

3D Robotics Aero Operational Risk Management

The 3DR Aero is a small fixed-wing airplane constructed primarily of Styrofoam with carbon fiber reinforcement. It is widely used in third-world countries for conservation efforts. A Pixhawk autopilot performs the flight control and mission execution functions. The electric-powered aircraft is capable of carrying a wide range of small cameras pointed downward to perform mapping flights. It is launched by hand and can perform a mission in manual mode or entirely autonomously.

Figure 1. 3D Robotics Aero mapping platform.

Preliminary Hazard List (PHL)

            To my knowledge, an ORM document does not exist for the 3DR Aero. Working from personal experience with the platform, I listed the safety issues that could arise during each stage of the flight. Organization of the PHL was conducted from the template in Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems by Marshall, et. al (2011). Each stage of flight is lettered, and each safety issue is numbered with Roman numerals. Risk levels were calculated via guidelines from MIL-STD-882E (2012), so higher numbers and letters indicate lower risk.

Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)

            To accomplish a PHA, each issue was provided with a possible mitigating action. A residual risk was then calculated. Because this hazard analysis has not been completed before, an additional column was added to capture success of mitigating factors to make future changes to operational risk management techniques.

 

Table 1. 3DR Aero PHL/PHA.

Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment Tool

            The “3D Robotics Aero Flight Risk Assessment” is loosely based on the PHA but primarily focuses on environmental factors that could lead to damage or loss of the aircraft. This ORM assumes visual line of sight operation under a U.S. civil/commercial Part 107 operation with a valid night waiver and required equipment. Three basic mission types are presented, with risk for each being higher at night in all areas. This is due to the reduced situation awareness and ability to maintain separation from obstacles. As with the PHA risk mitigation factors above, the ORM would need to be tested operationally to determine the accuracy of the risk values, particularly with crews of varying experience.

3D Robotics Aero
Flight Risk Assessment
Mission Details
Date:		RPIC:
Mission:		VO:
Mission Planning					Total:
Mission Type					Day	Night
Test					3	4
Training					2	3
Support					1	2
Environmental Conditions (Forecast or Current)					Total:
Cloud Layers					Day	Night
>1000'					1	2
800-1000'					2	3
700-800'					3	4
Wind					Day	Night
1-5 kts steady, gusts <10 kts					1	2
5-10 kts steady, gusts <15 kts					2	3
10-15 kts steady, gusts <20 kts					3	4
Dewpoint Spread					Day	Night
>5 C					1	2
3-5 C					2	3
1-3 C					3	4
Mission Details					Total:
Flight Mode					Day	Night
Manual Landing					3	4
Auto Landing					2	3
Crew Selection					Total:
Experience Level					Day	Night
<10 hrs					3	4
10-30 hrs					2	3
30+ hours					1	2
Prohibited Conditions (auto no-go):				Risk Value Summary:
Clouds below 700', visibility < 1 SM				Low Risk xx-xx
Known or forecast precipitation				Medium Risk xx-xx
Relative Humidity >95%				High Risk xx-xx

References

Ardupilot Dev Team. (2016). APM: plane. Retrieved from http://ardupilot.org/plane/index.html

Department of Defense. (2012, May). Department of Defense standard practice – system safety (MIL-STD-882E). Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Materiel Command.

Marshall, D. M. B. R. K. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Baton Rouge: CRC Press. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/erau/ detail.action?docID=1449438