I approached this assignment with an open
mind, prepared to read available sources and change my opinion for or against
the use of UAS in remote warfare. My professional background in the UAS
industry began with extensive experience as a contractor providing
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to the U.S. military. I
witnessed firsthand the ability of UAS to provide safety and security, both to
soldiers in harm’s way and to the local population, by providing overwatch of
essential traffic routes to prevent deployment of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). This was one of many different tasks I performed while deployed
overseas. It was routine work and extremely boring, but the importance of the
task was never downplayed.
Modern
warfare and the need to reduce collateral damage to civilians has brought about
the need for consistent surveillance of a target prior to a strike (the principle of distinction, discussed
below). Armed UAS such as the MQ-9 fulfill both a surveillance and strike role.
Warfare requiring additional verification of targets puts manned pilots in
harm’s way for a longer period, so UAS provide an advantage. However, the
primary human factors challenge with remotely piloting an aircraft is “sensory
isolation”; removing the auditory, visual, kinesthetic, and proprioceptive
senses from the pilot. Instead of operating an aircraft traditionally, the UAS
pilot now commands an aircraft indirectly through programmed routes, menu
selections, and dedicated knobs and switches. The role of UAS pilot has shifted
from an aircraft operator to a supervisor of automated systems, and the role of
human-machine interfaces is more important. Over-trust in an HMI can lead to a
lack of vigilance (Hopcroft, Burchat, and Vince, 2006).
Sarah Kreps and John Kaag wrote a legal
and ethical analysis of the use of UAVs in contemporary conflict, published in Polity in 2012. They define principles
of distinction (the ability to differentiate civilian from combatant) and
proportionality (military gain must exceed anticipated damage to civilians),
and provide summaries of opposing viewpoints in the discussion on remote
warfare. The point that provided most clarity for me was that proportionality
can only be defined when the strategic ends are clearly defined. In the case of
the “global war on terror,” the strategic ends that justified the means of
using remote warfare was the fight against “evil,” a present but abstract
enemy. The description of the overall strategy of the U.S. military strategy in
2009 onwards was the use of the term “overseas contingency operations,” where a
“contingency” removed the ethical challenge of conducting warfare that
“democratically transformed” the Middle East by removal of dictators. Instead,
a contingency refers to something that happens by chance, or may happen but has
not yet. In this sense, Kreps and Kaag argue that the scope of remote warfare
is widened even further by allowing the targeting of anyone, dictator or
terrorist, who is actively or could plan to attack the national security of the
U.S. The concept of proportionality applied to contingency operations also
opens the debate about the role of military operations against enemies who
often successfully blend in with a civilian population, delivering a disadvantage
to technology. On one hand, a military force carries the responsibility of
protecting the civilian population, often to the same degree as protecting
themselves, but the argument is that the enemy forces have put themselves in
the position to be targeted among civilians and therefore carry the ethical
responsibility for civilian casualties.
I agree with the former perspective,
especially in an asymmetric environment, where the invading force maintains
aerial superiority and can therefore conduct surveillance without opposition.
Manned surveillance flights are inherently shorter endurance than unmanned;
unmanned aircraft almost exclusively conduct the surveillance of targets. This
can lead to an over-reliance on technology to provide distinction. If remote
warfare is to be conducted ethically, then policy should exist to communicate
standards of proportionality to all levels of warfare decision-making and
provide legal ability to individuals at every level to ensure distinction.
Practically, this may mean a reduction in strike capability if distinction
cannot be assured. The “guy on the ground” will always have the better
perspective of the situation; I do not think remote warfare can be morally
conducted without this perspective, but I support the use of remote warfare
with UAVs to aid this perspective and reduce risk as much as possible.
References:
Hopcroft, R., Burchat, E.,
and Vince, J. (2006, May). Unmanned
aerial vehicles for maritime patrol: human factors issues (DSTO-GD-0463). Fisherman’s
Bend, Victoria: Defence Science and Technology Organisation.
Kreps, S., and Kaag, J.
(2012, April). The use of unmanned aerial vehicles in contemporary conflict: A
legal and ethical analysis. Polity,
44(2), pp. 260-285. Retrieved from http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1057/pol.2012.2
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